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 The relationship between economics and history has always been uneasy not least since the 
marginalist revolution of the 1870s laid down the foundations for contemporary mainstream 
economics. The tension between the two disciplines is not difficult to understand. Quite apart from 
differences in style and research methods which divide all disciplines, the dull concern of the dismal 
science with patterns of supply and demand seem too far removed from historical themes and how 
societies evolve and change over extended periods. Nor do standard assumptions within economics 
endear it to historians, with resources, technology and preferences taken as exogenous. An 
uncomfortable accommodation between the disciplines had been reached with the emergence of the 
new economic history. The success of cliometrics has been significant but limited by its failure to 
remove beyond what are generally perceived to be severe limitations of neoclassical economics, 
especially in studying historical themes. Over the past two decades, however, economic theory has 
itself begun to address some of these deficiencies, albeit on its own terms. By stressing market 
imperfections, especially those derived from informational imperfections by way of theoretical novelty, 
mainstream economics has purported not only to eschew dependence on models of perfect competition, 
but also to be able to broach non-market and non-economic factors such as institutions and collective 
and customary behaviour. Not surprisingly, this has led to a renewed assault upon history by economics 
and its representatives within economic history. 
 
 This paper is concerned to assess these recent developments. Section 2 presents a 
representative account from some of the relevant literature drawn from business history. Section 3 
provides a critique by emphasising the consequences of the reductionism involved, its arising both 
from the methodological individualism of neoclassical economics and its use of market imperfections 
as the prism through which to assess economic and social change. Section 4 locates the incursions of 
economics into economic history in the wider context of its more general encroachment upon other 
social sciences. The concluding remarks welcome the incorporation of an economic content into other 
disciplines but cautions against unwitting, let alone uncritical, acceptance of a colonising economics. 
 
2 Product Report 
 
 In a sequence of edited conference volumes, organised from the National Bureau of Economic 
Research, a renewed attempt has been made to bring economists and business historians together 
despite the confessed failures that have accompanied the enterprise in the past through the earlier 
incursions of the new economic history or cliometrics , Temin (ed) (1991), Lamoreaux and Raff (eds) 
(1995), and Lamoreaux et al (eds) (1999).2 The later endeavour has the virtue of making explicit the 
following features. 
 
 First, it rejects the previous basis on which economics has sought to collaborate with business 
history, and economic history, more generally. What is termed "traditional" neoclassical economics, 
and continuing interpretations of it, are perceived to have relied unduly upon unacceptable and 
simplistic assumptions associated with the model of perfect competition. Thus, for Lamoreaux et al 
(1997, p. 62): 
 
Traditional neoclassical theory assumed that economic actors were rational beings who made 
optimizing decisions on the basis of perfect information and foreknowledge. This highly 
stylized view of human behavior was a useful simplification that enabled economists to deal 
with certain kinds of otherwise intractable problems, especially concerning markets, in an 
effective way. 
 
As a result, despite the presumed ability to deal with markets effectively, the firm is reduced to a "black 
box - as an equation-solving entity that determined prices and output by setting marginal revenue equal 
to marginal cost", p. 62. By contrast, whilst the theory has some purchase over the behaviour of 
differentiated consumers, it is not able to address the complex and varied ways in which firms exist and 
function as organisations, Lamoreaux et al (1999, p. 6): 
 
Firms as such figured in the analysis only in such detail as was necessary to make the models 
of markets work. This treatment was no different from that which the theory accorded to other 
economic actors, but because firms typically are complex organizations composed of people 
who often have conflicting interests and goals, the effect was particularly unworldly. 
Neoclassical theory endowed firms with perfect knowledge … and with the ability to act both 
instantaneously and effectively. Whereas consumers were portrayed as maximizing utility, a 
concept that at least paid lip service to the idea that human beings may have different 
preferences, firms were depicted as maximizing the more objective concept of profit. 
 
In short, whilst the traditional can handle consumers and markets, it is ill-equipped to deal with firms 
and organisations. For Temin (1991, p. 7), "traditional economic theory … is of only limited use to 
business historians", not least because of its inability to deal with firms, wants, strategies and 
organisation.3 
 
 Second, the new economics adopted to resolve these conundrums continues to be drawn from 
the neoclassical tradition, relying upon theoretical developments within the discipline over the past two 
decades in which emphasis is placed upon market imperfections in the form of informational 
imperfections and asymmetries. As a result, attention can be given to the different effects of such 
market imperfections as well as the non-market forms  of responding to them, not least in opening up 
the black box of intra-firm organisation and behaviour. As Temin (1991, p. 2) puts it in the opening 
introduction to the first volume, in highlighting their novelty: 
 
The first theme is analytic … information is the key element to the functioning of an 
enterprise. 
 
By the third volume, the introduction is making even grander claims, Lamoreaux et al (1999, p. 14/5): 
 
More than any other factor, the ability to collect and use information effectively determines 
whether firms, industry, groups, and even nations will succeed or fail. 
 
Information, then, is the decisive variable in analysing economic performance. 
 
 Third, closely related to the elevation of information to such prominence, is the notion that 
apparently diverse applications have a common analytical core. For Lamoreaux et al (1999, p. 15), 
commenting on diverse case studies: 
 
All of the authors take the imperfect state of information as their starting point, and all aim to 
illuminate the ways in which this condition effects the playing out of economic life. This 
common preoccupation then leads to a deeper source of coherence - the structural unity behind 
all these various topics. The information problems that firms face in their internal operations 
are not so different from those faced by firms and other economic actors when they interact 
with one another. Further, the solutions adopted in response to these information problems 
typically have many features in common, even though they often result in the creation of 
capabilities that are specific to the organization. 
 
Thus, different issues can be handled analytically in the same way and still provide, to be taken up 
again below, for organisational and historical specificity. 
 
 Fourth, as already implicit, the subject matter of the volumes has evolved through an 
expanding universe. Beginning modestly with intra-firm issues, in which the outside environment is 
taken as given, it has moved to inter-firm relations and, ultimately towards the economy as a whole. It 
is simply a matter of shifting out the boundaries of the scope of analysis to deal with common intra- 
and inter-organisational informational problems, Lamoreaux et al (1999, p. 10):4 
 
Although … previous volumes dealt with learning processes, the present volume moves this 
theme to center stage by asking explicitly how firms, industries, and even nations can learn to 
overcome uncertainty … The essays in this volume thus mark a transition from focussing on 
problems that are common to a whole class of firms  or industries to explaining why firms, 
groups, and nations can differ in important and persistent ways. 
 
In addition to dealing with learning and uncertainty within and between such organisations, the theory 
is able to address their own divisions as in where one firm ends and another begins. Temin (1991, p. 3) 
observes: 
 
The vertical relations within business enterprises have many important common 
characteristics … the problems and the solutions are similar at the level of employee 
compensation, the direction of business units, and the finance of enterprises as a whole. In 
fact, the solutions to these information problems are important determinants of where the 
boundaries of business enterprises lie. 
 
The universal applicability of the information-theoretic approach renders it extensive in scope. 
 
 Fifth, aware of its reliance upon formal mathematical models with claims of universal 
applicability, the new approach is sensitive to the charge from historians of neglect of what it terms 
"time and context". However, the new theory presents itself as free from or, less vulnerable, to such 
charges because it deploys game theory in which history matters and for which outcomes and future 
strategies depend upon paths taken from or around multiple equilibria in the past. In short, Lamoreaux 
and Raff (1995, p. 5): 
 
The historian critics should take heart from the way the economists' literature developed … 
The first game theorists had sought unique equilibrium solutions to their problems. These 
would inevitably be independent of history. But, as research advanced, it became clear that the 
games frequently possessed multiple equilibria. Because only one outcome could actually 
happen, theorists needed to think about selection principles. Players' expectations came to be 
recognized as quite important, as did the history of relations between the players. Time and 
context mattered after all. 
 
So, despite formal models, history figures in the form of "time and context". 
 
 Sixth, such potential variability in outcomes carries a potential cost because the wide range of 
different models, and the multiple equilibria potentially attached to each, suggest difficulties in coming 
to firm conclusions, Lamoreaux et al (1999, p. 9):5 
 
But the richness of this literature is also its Achilles' heel, because it gives the appearance that 
anything can happen in the absence of good - that is, cheap - information. Of course, this 
impression is false - there are many constraints operating to limit the choices that actors make. 
At the simplest level, the desire to pay one's bills or make a profit can limit the number of 
actions that seem wise; similarly, competitive forces can constrain the alternatives that are 
reasonable to take. 
 
Despite the indeterminacies that are characteristic of the new economic theory, there is no reason for 
rejecting it as causally empty because it builds in constraints on potential outcomes. 
 
 Seventh, the uncertainties in the new economic theory delineate a distinctive role for the 
historian; it is to filter out unrealistic models and to uncover the historically feasible relationship 
between information and choice, Lamoreaux et al ( 1999, p. 9): 
 
Historians can offer economists intellectual discipline simply by focusing their efforts on what 
they are well-trained to do: elucidating what economic actors actually know at any given point 
in time, how they use their knowledge to make informed choices, and how they learn from 
their past decisions. 
 
There is some awareness that this might appear to place business historians in a servile status relative to 
economists, Lamoreaux et al (1997, p. 77): 
 
We do not see business historians as research assistants for economists who engage in a higher 
level of thinking. 
 
Rather, it is intended that they should internalise the new economic theory in order to discover the 
commonalities across what would otherwise be diverse case studies, Lamoreaux et al (1997, p. 77), 
continuing from above and closing this article: 
 
Although we hope that a byproduct of this dialogue will be better modelling by economists, 
our main concern is that the work of individual business historians redound to the credit of the 
field of business history as a whole. The real benefit of recent theoretical developments in 
economics is that they enable business historians to recognize the essential unity that underlies 
a great number of the problems with which they are concerned. As a result, studies on one 
topic can resonate with studies on others, strengthening them all and, in turn, the field as a 
whole. 
 
Business history essentially becomes the application of an appropriately identified model to the 
problems of informational imperfections. 
 
 Eighth, there is no need for business historians to become fully trained in the esoteric 
mathematical modelling attached to the new economics, Lamoreaux et al (1999, p. 9): 
 
There is no requirement that historians adopt formal theoretical approaches in their work or 
even that they weave their narratives around abstract economic models.  
 
Business historians need be motivated less by "formal economic theory, in a direct or self-conscious 
way", and more by "questions growing out of this literature", Lamoreaux and Raff (1995, p. 5). The 
technical high ground attached to mainstream economics can be incorporated by business historians by 
embracing the results of their new theory into their thinking and research. 
 
 Finally, the new approach adopts a particular stance towards the evolution of the relations and 
tensions between business history and economics.6 It is tempting to understand this in parallel with, or 
as a parody of, the new approach itself. As Temin (1995, p. 316) puts it: 
 
Research, expressed in the formal, mathematical terms beloved of economic theorists, is not 
very accessible to business historians. This clash of cultures gives rise to a problem of 
information flows in our disciplines that mirrors the problems we analyze. 
 
Drawing primarily on the experience of the United States, initial divisions within business history at 
the turn of the century are perceived to focus on theory versus description, with the latter seeking 
generalisation out of accumulation of case studies rather than investigation of "the discipline of the 
market that … could provide insight into larger economic processes", Lamoreaux et al (1999, p. 3). 
Such divisions became institutionalised with the theoretically inclined resorting, at times informally, to 
Parsonian sociology. Economic theory ultimately was introduced giving rise to cliometrics but with a 
greater emphasis upon markets than entrepreneurship. Its influence grew "to dominate the Economic 
History Association" leading to the formation of the Business History Conference, "to provide 
historians fleeing the cliometric revolution with a new organizational base", Lamoreaux et al (1999, p. 
5). 
 
 Such institutional and intellectual fragmentation of economic history is in part explained by 
the weaknesses of the "traditional" neoclassical economics, most notably its excessive reliance upon 
perfect markets and its inability to explain long-run development.7 Even its initial proponents became 
disillusioned whilst the intellectual chasm between cliometrics and business history widened further.8 
Lamoreaux (1998, p. 69) cites the shifting position of Douglass North. He makes clear that his initial 
belief in the ability of property relations to shift in response to resource costs had foundered on the 
problem of "ideology". Economic rationality is insufficient to explain how it is formed, and hence the 
institutions on which property rights and their application depend, North (1981, p. 11/2):9 
 
The dilemma of explaining change can be put succinctly. Neoclassical economic theory can 
explain how people acting in their own self-interest behave; it can explain why people do not 
bother to vote; it can explain why, as a result of the free rider problem, people will not 
participate in group actions where the individual gains are negligible. It cannot, however, 
explain effectively the reverse side of the coin … How do we account for altruistic behavior 
… Neoclassical theory is equally deficient in explaining stability. Why do people obey the 
rules of society when they could evade them to their benefit? … Something more than an 
individualistic calculus of cost/benefit is needed in order to account for change and stability 
… Individuals may also obey customs, rules, and laws because of an equally deep-seated 
conviction that they are legitimate. Change and stability in history require a theory of ideology 
to account for these deviations from the individualistic rational calculus of neoclassical theory.  
 
Now, however, as outlined above, the new neoclassical economics has broken with the imperfections 
of the old, and the logical possibility, and desirability, of reuniting economics and business history 
within economic history are considered to have been established. Presumably, if only such theory had 
been available at an earlier stage, the path-dependent divorce between the different intellectual worlds 
would not now have be so formidable. 
 
3 Testing the Product 
 
  The preceding account has presented the new approach to business history on its own terms. 
To do so fairly and without misrepresentation, it has drawn heavily upon extensive quotation, as does 
the critical assessment that follows, in order to avoid the danger of addressing a constructed straw 
product. Initially, consider the new approach in the broader intellectual context attached to the recent 
developments within economics upon which it is exclusively based. As argued elsewhere,10 economics 
is currently seeking to colonise the other social sciences much more aggressively than previously. The 
basis for doing so has been considerably strengthened by the new information-theoretic economics11 
which has inspired the new approach to business history. As the latter recognises, theoretical 
developments within microeconomics around market imperfections in general and informational 
imperfections and asymmetries in particular have meant a break with models of perfect competition, 
even if by way of deviation. They have also allowed for non-market forms of organisation to be 
addressed. But none of this is new to "traditional" neoclassical economics since both market 
imperfections and the impact of transactions cost, say, on the organisation of firms or other institutions 
have long been recognised.  
 
 What is more fundamentally innovative within the new microeconomics is its ability to 
examine social structure, institutions and customs, albeit on the continuing basis of the peculiar form 
taken by methodological individualism in which utility maximisation is the ultimate rationale for both 
economic (and market) and non-economic (and non-market) behaviour. Employers, for example, have 
an incentive to structure labour markets on the basis of their more or less perfect knowledge of the 
distribution of skills but their imperfect knowledge of their incidence as individual attributes - so that 
workers of different capacities are treated as if the same and, potentially, vice-versa.12 More generally, 
such considerations are not specific to labour markets; in principle, they apply to each market where 
there are informational imperfections and asymmetries. Depending on what form these take, a variety 
of outcomes are possible. Markets may clear (supply equals demand) but be inefficient, they may not 
clear at all (supply and demand unequal even in equilibrium), or there may be missing markets (failure 
of supply and demand altogether). In addition, non-market forms of interaction and apparent 
abandonment of (direct) pursuit of self interest can be an appropriate response to informational 
imperfections.  
 
In short, despite continuing reliance upon optimising individuals, the new neoclassical 
economics is marked by two points of departure from the old. As observed, it purports to incorporate 
the social, whether as institution or custom for example, as something that can be explained rather than, 
as previously, needing to take it as given - usually as a constraint on optimisation as in technology, 
preferences or endowments. By the same token, the boundary between what is exo genous and what is 
endogenous is shifted in favour of the latter, within both market and non-market spheres. Not 
surprisingly, such analytical advances have opened up the other social sciences to economics as never 
before. This is indicated by a whole range of "new" areas - the new institutional economics, the new 
political economy, the new growth theory, the new trade theory, the new household economics, the 
new financial economics, the new development economics, the new labour economics, and so on. 
These often, like cliometrics, have their origins in the traditional neoclassical economics, and the 
simple extension of economic rationality to non-economic applications, but they have all been 
reinforced and propelled outward by the analytical achievements of the new information-theoretic 
microfoundations. 
 
In this light, it is worth examining the new approach to business history in the broader 
intellectual climate outlined above, as part of the more general process of colonisation of other social 
sciences by economics in the wake of its internal analytical advances. For it is part of something more 
than a settling of accounts between economists and historians even if, in taking its place on the wider 
canvas, it does exhibit its own characteristics. Consider a number of general features of the colonisation 
and their relevance to the new approach. 
 
First and foremost, an inescapable aspect of the new microfoundations, shared in common 
with the traditional neoclassical economics, is its reductionism. This has a number of critical 
components which are distinct but interrelated. At the analytical level, the social is reduced to the 
aggregated behaviour of optimising individuals and does not exist independently of such atomised 
behaviour. Paradoxically, the new economics prides itself on such methodological individualism and 
congratulates itself for extending the scope of analysis by incorporating informational imperfections as 
an explanatory tool and the non-economic and social as an explanatory outcome. This involves a 
tension insofar as influence on social theory is concerned. For, whilst the social is addressed where 
previously it was taken as given, an attraction, the basis on which it is done is ultimately individualistic 
and denies the independent existence of the social, a drawback for other approaches within social 
science that rejects rational choice theory. It means an absence of independently given social relations, 
structures and tendencies, as well as their analytical accompaniments such as consideration of power 
and conflict. Significantly, it is extremely rare for the new approach to business history to advertise its 
dependence upon methodological individualism, the unshifting ingredient in its (continuing) reliance 
upon a shifting neoclassical economics. It is far more concerned to emphasise outcomes in terms of 
explaining social organisation within and between firms. Yet, the reductionism of the approach is made 
clear at times, Lamoreaux et al (1999, p. 9/10):13 
 
For business historians to provide theorists  with this kind of intellectual discipline, they have 
to communicate their findings in a way that economists can appreciate … All that is necessary 
is that they share with economists a few fundamental assumptions about how human beings 
behave. Too often, historians have reacted to the limitations of the neoclassical approach by 
attacking the notion of economic rationality itself - by challenging the idea that at its heart 
economic behavior is fundamentally a matter of weighing the expected outcomes of 
alternative decisions in a systematic fashion. But this is throwing out the baby with the bath 
water. One does not have to assume that economic actors are all-knowing to believe that they 
make the most advantageous choices they can on the basis of the limited information they 
possess. Thanks to recent developments, economists are now employing a more 
commonsensical notion of rationality - one that business historians should be able to embrace 
without doing violence to any of their deeply held beliefs about the importance of context, 
ideas, or culture. As a result, historians can offer economists intellectual discipline simply by 
focusing their efforts on what they are well-trained to do: elucidating what economic actors 
know at any given point in time, how they use their knowledge to make informed choices, and 
how they learn from their past decisions. 
 
At risk of pedestrian pursuit of metaphor, it is the social in the form of the bath itself that has been 
discarded even if retaining and refining its prior contents - optimising babies, only awash in a douche 
of imperfect information. 
 
 Further, just as the new economics is ahistorical in building up timelessly from the idea of 
optimising individuals, so it is asocial in two other respects. On the one hand, as is apparent from the 
assertion of the last two sentences of the last quotation, the notions of context, idea and culture are 
simply being reduced to the distribution and use of "information", which is itself understood 
unproblematically.14 This is to set aside entirely the lessons to be learnt from the postmodernist, and 
preceding, understandings of knowledge as socially constructed. Despite hints to the contrary, 
constructing the economy and society on the basis of informational imperfections and asymmetries is 
the denial not the reflection of, or parallel to, the postmodernist turn in history and social science more 
generally. Information is not given and either known or unknown, it is the consequence of its 
contextually contested, chaotic, contradictory and constructed interpretation and use. Discarding 
perfect competition and information or, more exactly, seeing them as a special case, does not match 
incorporating the cultural which is notably perceived to be attached to the linguistic as opposed to 
social and economic theory. For Lamoreaux (1998, p. 75/6):15 
 
In recent years this gulf ["between economic history and history proper"] has grown even 
wider as a result of shift in intellectual fashions in favour of cultural, as opposed to social and 
economic, history … This shift has effectively redefined historical studies …. to turn to 
literary theory rather than the social sciences for inspiration and guidance. Ironically, the 
discipline of economics has also been transformed by a series of theoretical developments that 
parallels in intriguing ways the emergence of critical theory in the humanities. Abandoning 
the convenient but unrealistic assumptions of traditional neoclassical theory - in particular the 
assumption that all economic actors make decisions on the basis of perfect information is 
scarce, imperfect, and costly, where people build institutions in order to cope with problems of  
imperfect information, where human beings' "bounded rationality" affects their economic 
decision making, and where economic processes can have multiple outcomes depending on 
participants' perceptions of each other's actions. 
 
It is significant how a dichotomy is being drawn between proper economic history and its cultural or 
literary turn, as if there were nothing in between and no alternatives either to the extremes of 
neoclassical economics or to postmodernism.16 Consequently, (business) culture is reduced to 
informational imperfections and how they are handled. As Lipartito (1995, p. 34) neatly puts it in his 
assessment of the role of culture (or lack of it) in business history: 
 
Some economic models today treat firms as temporal, intentional actors, acknowledging that 
they acquire new knowledge and correct past mistakes. But all this learning is rather more like 
that of the smart machine than the human mind. 
 
Nor is this corrected by disaggregating the firm, firms or the nation into smart machines and nor is this 
learning attached to social and economic relations, structures and conflicts other than as a collection of 
individual interpersonal connections. 
 
The new approach, like its economic theory, is also asocial by being ahistorical.17 As this 
charge is liable to be denied in view of the inclusion of "time and context", it needs to be carefully laid 
out and justified. Fundamentally, the theory depends upon universal categories that have no social or 
historical specificity - utility, production, technology, factor inputs, etc. This is reinforced by adding 
notions such as organisation and information. Ultimately, terms like capital and the firm, and the 
analytical results attached to them, whilst rooted in capitalist society, are derived transhistorically from 
such universal categories. Further, the models remain deterministic if not determined. One feature is 
that there are numbers of models from which to choose, with multiple equilibria attached to them. 
Consequently, history in the form of time and context only arises in order to make model choice and 
determine initial conditions or to allow for path-dependence.  Significantly, all such terms originate 
with the physical sciences and not with social theory or the humanities. 
 
Two further features illustrate the reductionism of the new approach. One is its own path-
dependence. As observed above, it has moved from intra- to inter-firm to national concerns, raising the 
same informational concerns to a higher or, more exactly, broader stage. It is not difficult to see why. 
For the theory needs to take as given the conditions within which optimising individuals determine 
their imperfectly informed decisions. Consequently, it is a simple matter to endogenise such 
exogenously given constraints by extending the new approach to them. It is an extension that not only 
creeps from firm to nation (and globe?) but also from economic to non-economic and through history. 
Where do you stop without relying on unexplained exogeneity? Ultimately, something must be taken as 
given, and it will tend to be the naturalised categories of capital, prices, wages, etc as well as the 
individuals as "smart machines" that deploy them. Or will it be the inherited customs and institutions, 
"the time and context", from which history proceeds anew?18 
 
These conundrums surrounding the definition of boundaries between exogenous and 
endogenous, however, can only be satisfactorily lifted by adopting an alternative methodology, not 
least one which takes a starting point at the opposite extreme to methodological individualism and its 
associated reductionism in which socially and historically specific are critically unravelled. In short, 
reflecting the final and most overt reductionism, is capitalism let alone the whole of human history 
nothing more than the response to informational imperfections? To his credit, Douglass North's 
recognition of these issues leads him to diverge from neoclassical theory in an attempt to examine how 
the institutional and the customary evolve historically. The result is an eclecticism and arbitrariness 
that, nonetheless, continues to be marked by its starting point in the neoclassical understanding of the 
workings of perfect markets.19  
 
But the point, and others, can also be illustrated by considering one of the favoured 
applications of the new approach, that of finance. It is associated with a new financial economics which 
seeks to address the differences between financial systems in terms set by the information-theoretic 
microfoundations.20 Essentially, borrowers (firms, say) have more information about themselves than 
lenders (banks). Such informational asymmetry leads both to market imperfections - interest rates too 
high, borrowers who cannot get loans at the going rate of interest, and missing financial markets - and 
potentially induces non-market responses in the form of bank representation on companies. In addition, 
banking practices or customs may rationally come to differ, with long-term commitment on both sides 
so that banks gain the advantage of loyal customers who do not desert when tempted by an interest rate 
cut; and firms accrue financial support over critical times for restructuring.  
 
Of course, the foregoing is an idealised description of the so-called main bank system, 
supposedly characteristic of Japan and Germany, as opposed to the market-based system associated 
with the UK and the US where firms have to sink and swim over the long term and primarily depend 
upon short -term, stock market or self-finance which leads them inefficiently vulnerable to closure over 
the  business cycle. In practice, such idealised features of the two sharply delineated financial systems 
are not borne out empirically. But a rather different point needs to be emphasised. This is that the 
differences between financial systems, a feature that has long been recognised prior to the emergence 
of the new microfoundations as in debate over the role of the City, is subject to reduction to the 
intrinsic contracting problems of imperfectly informed borrowers and lenders for which, greater 
monitoring through bank representation on corporate boards is a solution. By contrast, and rightly, 
earlier literature has focused on the ext rinsic properties, or external economic and political 
environment, in which such contracting takes place, especially the role of the state, for example, in 
industrial and monetary policy, and the role of (fractions of) classes in exercising influence over the 
state. Otherwise the success of the Japanese financial system in generating and applying finance for 
investment is reduced to the empirically questionable notion that bankers are primarily concerned to be 
au fait with the strategies of their customers rather than their short-term solvency. 
 
So much for reductionism. In a nutshell, and reduced itself to its core, it derives from 
methodological individualism combined with an understanding of both the economic (market) and non-
economic (non-market) worlds as the consequence of consistent interpersonal interactions in response 
to market (informational) imperfection. Formally, the economic models involved are universal in 
application so that time and context (history and society) do not enter ab initio. This provides for a 
blank sheet on which they can be filled out by empirical study, whose inclusion is motivated by the 
notion of path-dependence (as the way of choosing between model equilibria). 
 
4 The Broader Environment  
 
The reductionism to methodological individualism and market imperfections, and reliance 
upon increasingly formal mathematical models, has often imparted a particular form of influence of the 
new economics on the other social sciences. For, as already observed, the models involved excise 
social and historical content in anything other than name. Consequently, they can be reintroduced not 
only in the form of the empirical resolution of path-dependence but also on the basis of the continuing 
traditions and concerns of the colonised disciplines and topics. Further, such incursions tend to be 
informal, adopting the language rather than the models of economics, as in reference to human capital 
in any number of applications and rent-seeking and collective action when discussing institutions. Of 
course, it is also possible for formal economic models to be directly applied theoretically and 
empirically to other disciplines or non-economic topics without such informalities. 
 
In the latter case, economics merely draws upon other disciplines for definition of an issue and 
on which to exercise its models. If so, as will be seen, the colonisation of the other social sciences by 
economics is particularly open to being parasitic, arrogant, ignorant and contemptuous. In general, 
economic history is less susceptible to such charges because of its longstanding traditions of 
scholarship in which reference to other literature and sources of evidence are, in principle, fully 
exploited. In this light, consider each of the charges in turn. 
 
The parasitism of colonisation arises out of the lack of social and historical content that 
characterises the underlying theory. Its origins within economics means that it has been applied first to 
market imperfections in isolation in order to explain why markets may be inefficient, fail to clear, or be 
absent. It is then extended to non-market forms and to any other problem in the social sciences - with 
the exception of anything involving the social construction of meaning for which it is powerless. But, 
by its nature, the theory does not construct problems, it only offers solutions to problems that already 
exist, together with the corresponding concepts with which they have been posed. Within economics, 
the problems are why is that markets might not work perfectly and why is the market not the only form 
of social organisation. These are well-established problems within economics with a range of answers, 
varying from different versions of Keynesianism to different schools of political economy which share 
in common a rejection of methodological individualism. Otherwise, in the other social sciences, any 
number of theoretical issues and concepts can be appropriated and reinterpreted within the new 
information-theoretic approach. Whilst it is explicit from the previous discussion that the new approach 
is parasitic on historians for model selection and path dependence, more fundamental is its dependence 
on historians for the issues that it poses and the concept it uses and transforms to address them. Of 
course, all analytical advances are liable to confront, draw upon, and even revolutionise traditional 
scholarship. As a result of its reductionism, however, the new approach can only do this in the form of 
reinterpretation on the basis of its own understanding of informational imperfections.21 
 
In much of the general colonisation of the social scientists, such parasitism is also associated 
with arrogance in two respects. For, having exploited the other social sciences for their problems and 
concepts, the results of such previous scholarship are reproduced as if innovative by virtue of having 
been based upon informational imperfections. At times, this borders on the farcical with naïve 
economists claiming to have shown, for example, that institutions matter and that labour markets differ 
from other markets as if this were not already well-known from a variety of other perspectives. Sabel 
(1991, p. 248/9) makes the point in a different way: 
 
One of the great opportunities, as I see it, of the new economic information broadly 
understood is precisely to understand the way the views and strategies of the economic actors 
as structured by the economy's manifold connection to political and social life shape economic 
outcomes - and, I cannot help adding, vice-versa. Stopping short of that will mean merely 
reproducing old results and statements in new language. 
 
However, Sabel's reservation concerning what will be the simultaneity between the economic 
and non-economic is not a problem for the new approach, although it might appear to be so simply by 
virtue of the fact that its analytical evolution reflects a path dependence with the economic (and perfect 
competition) as its starting point. In addition, though, as the second form of arrogance, it is precisely 
the failure of previous analyses to have proceeded from informational imperfections which leads them 
to be perceived as both deficient and lacking theoretical rigour which, in the hands of economic 
theorists, always means mathematical modelling irrespective of conceptual coherence and validity. 
 
How does the new approach to business history relate to such arrogance? It is far more subtle 
than is often found in other examples of colonisation and, for that reason, may be an undeserving label. 
But economic historians, like heterodox economists, must be as familiar with the notions of "rigour" 
and "science" and their ready and facile application to anything other than mathematical modelling and 
statistical methods. Nonetheless, although not going so far, there is a strong sense of analytical 
superiority amongst the new business historians. For Lamoreaux (1998, p. 75), for example, it is 
effectively claimed that economics is difficult but history is easy, with historians unable or unwilling to 
keep up with advances in scholarship:22 
 
Not only have the two groups of academics deprived themselves of the benefits of cross-
fertilization of ideas, but because practitioners on either side of the divide have failed to keep 
abreast of developments on the other, they have not upheld the profession's minimal standards 
of scholarly competence. Because keeping up with the economic history literature required 
more effort for historians than the reverse did for cliometricians, the negative consequences 
have been particularly apparent on the historical side … [who] continue to evince an often 
painful naiveté about economic concepts, equating, for example, market behavior with the 
narrow pursuit of profits and suggesting that the mere existence of markets can somehow 
force a supply response from unwilling participants. 
 
On the other hand, the new approach boasts scholars of a different calibre, p. 76: 
 
All these economic historians are well read in the historical literature, and many of them have 
done extensive archival research. Their studies are of high quality and should be of great 
interest to historians working in related areas. Whether, however, it is possible to 
communicate this relevance over the wall that currently divides economic history from the rest 
of the profession is a matter of serious concern. 
 
In short, apart from exh ibiting a prejudice in favour of the intellectual abilities of those attached to the 
new approach, it would appear that its best scholars are being unfairly set against the worst of those 
who will not accept their approach. In addition, there is no recognition on the part that the new 
approach, as revealed in the discussion of culture and information, that its notion of information is 
cultureless despite a vast historical and other literature to the contrary. This does not reflect ignorance, 
to be taken up next, since the literary and cultural turns of history are acknowledged. But this is as far 
as knowledge of that literature is taken. 
  
More generally, in terms of ignorance, the colonisation of social sciences by economics has 
been marked by total disregard for the scholarship of the appropriated disciplines and that attached to 
the object of analysis other than for the parasitical purposes outlined previously. It is simply a matter of 
investigating sources of, and applications for, informational imperfections. At best, earlier 
contributions are filtered for this purpose. Once again, not least given the claim of the last quotation 
above, the new approach to business history is more tempered, predominantly because there is greater 
dependence upon existing scholarship for historical material both for such analytical  purposes and 
especially for "time and context". However, as is apparent for the reductionism to methodological 
individualism and information, whether through ignorance or filter, the scope of economic and social 
theory that is recognised by the new approach is extraordinarily narrow.23  
 
This is especially so for the potted history given of the relationship between economic history 
and business history. Effectively, the only social theory recognised is Parsonian sociology, and 
neoclassical economics is the only representative of economic theory. All other relevant history is 
reduced to atheoretical and anti-theoretical descriptive investigation! Not surprisingly, the narrative of 
the evolution of these histories is one of the eventual movement of the vanguard away from flawed 
traditional economics to an unquestioned new approach from which the uninformed or incapable are 
either personally or institutionally discouraged from embracing. The idea that the past rejection of the 
new economic history, as well as its new version, might be on the basis of alternative methods and 
theory is simply not acknowledged.24 Rather, conveniently, the rejection of the earlier assault from 
economics is seen as justified on grounds of its attachment to perfect competition even if it was often 
rejected for what is seen to be the wrong reasons of being anti-theory in principle. This allows for the 
new economics to be projected uncritically as delivering the traditional from its deficiencies, for 
continuing resistance to be explained but interpreted as unjustified, and for alternative criticisms of the 
economic theory and its interaction with social theory to be overlooked together with its associated 
alternatives. Perhaps such rough justice to historiography is unsurprising since the what constitutes the 
economic has merely been moved marginally from traditional neoclassical economics to incorporate 
informational imperfections and asymmetries, with a corresponding understanding of the non-
economic. Effectively, from a position of having excluded the social, or treating it as economic by 
other means, the social has been brought back in on the narrowest of bases, with the result that the vast 
majority of economic and social history and theory remains excluded from consideration as such. 
 
In colonising the other social sciences, economics reveals its contempt for them by the sum of 
the previously outlined features, with the sum greater than the individual parts. For anything that does 
not conform to its approach, which ultimately implies dependence upon mathematical models based on 
optimising individuals, is dismissed as lacking rigorous theory. Within economics itself, such contempt 
has been heavily associated with the extraordinary process of eliminating heterodox alternatives to the 
mainstream both in terms of methodology and technique. Mathematical models, methodological 
individualism and econometrics rule the profession to an unprecedented degree in what has been 
termed the internationalisation or Americanisation of the discipline by neoclassical economics.25 
Inevitably, in the US academic heartland, the colonisation of economic history will rely more or less 
exclusively on mainstream economics as much in the past as in the new future. It is worth recalling the 
earlier warning sounded half-jokingly by Heaton (1965) on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary 
of the Economic History Association: 
 
In fact, American research on European topics was so all pervading that some nasty-minded 
person may one day describe it as Yankee academic imperialism. 
 
Despite the different traditions within the UK both in terms of economics and economic and social 
history, Lamoreaux (1998, p. 71) is still able to report a 50% cliometric content for the Economic 
History Review for 1994. 
 
 So far, the role of the new approach as an example of colonisation by economics has primarily 
been assessed from the perspective of economics itself. How has it sought to occupy the analytical 
terrain previously occupied by other social sciences in general and economic and business history in 
general? It is also important to examine the way in which such incursions are received by host 
disciplines. Two general features have been identified. First, and most readily recognisable for the new 
approach to business and economics history is the incorporation of the new microfoundations in 
informal terms. This, as reported above, is explicitly encouraged by the new approach. The rationale is 
in order to save historians of the old type from having to command the technical details of the new 
microfoundations. However, there is a more sinister consequence of such informal transposition of the 
new economic theory in informal rather than formal terms. It has the effect of allowing for 
incorporation whilst concealing or even tempering, usually inconsistently, the formal assumptions on 
which it is based. It is easier, for example, to accept informal notions of differences in informational 
imperfections and time and context leading to differences in social organisation than it is to swallow 
the reductionism and methodological individualism associated with the new microfoundations. 
 
 Second, the way in which a colonising economics has been received by other disciplines and 
topics has been highly varied, depending heavily on the internal momentum of the host discipline. This 
is borne out by the new approach with, interestingly, marked differences between countries. For the 
United States, because economic history has traditionally been located within economic departments, it 
has more readily been appropriated by economics and led to the formation of a separate sub-discipline 
of cliometrics which has, in turn, had influence elsewhere. Compared to other disciplines this is 
unusual for there are two broad, not mutually exclusive, but typical responses to an invasive 
economics. One is to incorporate it in some form, the other is to proceed more or less uninfluenced 
either at the core or the margin or somewhere in-between. However, this rarely leads to the creation of 
a separate discipline in its own right. Thus, anthropology and anything involving culture have been 
relatively untouched by a colonising economics. On the other hand, development economics has been 
profoundly affected. Even one of the most successful forms that colonisation has taken, the acceptance 
of human capital as a concept across the social sciences, has not led to a separate discipline equivalent 
to cliometrics. The partition of business history is a specific response of the broader discipline to the 




 The previous section has critically assessed the new approach by understanding it as part of a 
more general colonisation of the social sciences by economics. Because history is a discipline which 
has the potential to incorporate analytical elements from each of the social sciences, it is also possible 
to draw upon existing critiques of the colonisation that have already arisen in other contexts as well as 
the more general critique of mainstream neoclassical economics. In this context, the most pertinent 
example is the new development economics not least because earlier debate around the relationship 
between economics and economic history dwelled on the issue of its relevance to development.26 In 
addition, in a striking parallel to the new approach to business history, the World Bank has recently 
undergone an intellectual revolution. Led by Joe Stiglitz, a leading theorist of the information-theoretic 
economics, it has rejected the neo-liberal Washington consensus, based on the notion that the market 
works best if left as far as possible to its own devices. In its place, the post-Washington consensus has 
been proposed in which the problems of development are primarily conceived in terms of market 
imperfections, especially those based on informational imperfections.27 
 
 The post-Washington consensus has already been received with considerable suspicion, not 
least because it has been used to justify the extension of state intervention on terms set by the World 
Bank whilst predominantly remaining market-friendly, Hildyard (1998). Analytically, the post-
Washington consensus is essentially a watered-down reconstruction of the 
Keynesian/welfarism/modernisation approach to development that characterised the period of the post-
war boom that preceded the Washington consensus, Fine (1998c) and Standing (1999).28 It is, however, 
based on microeconomic principles and, not surprisingly, is otherwise unable to accommodate 
traditional concerns within development economics and studies, those addressing economic and social 
relations, structures, and processes as well as the formation of classes and their economic and political 
conflicts. In other words, the post-Washington consensus is the new approach to business his tory writ 
large - the same analytical content but broader ambitions in scope of subject matter and implications 
for policy. By the same token, it seeks to incorporate and reduce all other development theory with 
which it comes into contact.29 
 
 Alternatives depend upon not falling into the clichéd patterns of analysis which are portrayed 
by the new approach as filling out what they do not or cannot cover themselves. It is necessary to 
embrace theory and to make it explicit, not least to draw upon a political economy which is appropriate 
to the issues being addressed, with a social and historical content sensitive to the specific period and 
object under study. The challenge is particularly urgent for, just as economics is seeking to colonise the 
other social sciences, so the extreme form of influence of postmodernism is on the wane. The chances 
are that the role of economics across the social sciences is set to increase as they incorporate a more 
substantial concession to material realism. What content and form such economics is to take is yet to be 
determined. But the outcome will depend upon the extent to which and the way in which a colonising 
economics is either accepted, incorporated or resisted, in business history as more generally.30 It would 
be surprising if economic and social history were to be totally colonised by a newer economic history, 
given the institutionalised separation that has resulted from past assaults. But, both for the sake of 
history and economics, it would also be unfortunate if the response were to be one of flight to the 




* This article was written whilst in receipt of a Research Fellowship from the UK Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) under award number R000271046 to study The New Revolution in 
Economics and Its Impact upon Social Sciences. It was completed whilst visiting the Department of 
Economics, University of Melbourne. 
 
1 Thanks to Steve Tolliday for critical commentary on an earlier draft, not all of which have been 
accommodated in this revised version. 
2 See also Lamoreaux et al (1997) and Lamoreaux (1998). 
3 This assessment of the old, then the new, was anticipated by Redlich (1965, p. 482) on the twenty-
fifth anniversary of the Economic History Association: 
 
Traditional economic history deals primarily with the development of economic institutions 
and secondarily with processes taking place therein. The new approaches tend to deal 
primarily with and directly with economic processes while more or less neglecting economic 
institutions. 
4 See Temin (1995, p. 315) for extension of "concern with information to include the coordination of 
activity both within and between firms". 
5 See Hounshell (1991, p. 39) and also Sutton (1995, p. 98) for whom: 
 
A decade of work on game-theoretic models in industrial organization has made it plain that, 
in representing any market of interests, there will usually be many a priori reasonable models, 
whose design differs in respect of features we cannot observe, identify, or proxy empirically. 
Now if all outcomes are possible, we are in the historian's realm of accident and personality; 
and the business historian need pay little heed to what the economist has to say. But this is 
not, in fact, the case. Many outcomes are possible, but by no means all. It turns out that there 
are certain competitive mechanisms whose operation across all reasonable candidate models 
constrains the set of possible outcomes. These "robust" mechanisms include, notably, the 
process of price competition and the process of competitive escalation of competitive efforts - 




Sutton refers to his own work, Sutton (1991), on how (endogenous) fixed costs and increasing returns 
to scale interact with market size to determine industrial structure. For a critique, see Fine (1999d) 
6 See especially Lamoreaux et al (1997 and 1999) and Lamoreaux (1998). 
7 It is also suggested that access to generous university funding allowed for fragmentation rather than 
debate and resolution in response to intellectual differences. 
8 Lamoreaux (1998, p. 69) cites the shifting position of Douglass North. See also Lamoreaux's (1998, p. 
77) closing remarks: 
 
Despite recent efforts, therefore, the organizations that cliometricians built so assiduously to 
promote their work during the early sixties now increasingly demarcate an intellectual ghetto. 
So, of course, do the many associations that the various other historical subdisciplines - from 
labour history to African-American and women's history to queer studies - have constructed 
over the past quarter century. Because, however, the cliometric revolution has largely run its 
course, it highlights in an especially clear way the double-edged character of these 
organizations. In particular, it highlights the intellectual costs that disciplinary fragmentation 
can entail. 
9 For a succinct view of his understanding of historical change, see North (1999, p. 15): 
 
We have initial perceptions of what reality constitutes. Those perceptions in turn lead to the 
construction of a set of beliefs, ideologies to explain that reality and explain the way that we 
should behave. That in turn leads to the creation of an institutional structure, or an institutional 
matrix, which then shapes our 'world'. And as our beliefs about that reality incrementally 
change, we enact policies that incrementally modify that institutional structure. An 
incremental change is always constrained by path dependence. That is, the existing institutions 
always constrain our choices. As we make those choices which are incrementally altering 
policy, we are changing reality. And in changing reality, we are changing in turn the belief 
system that we have. That circular flow has gone on ever since human beings began to try to 
shape their destiny. 
 
Note that North differs from the new business history in two respects. First, his ambition is much 
greater in terms of scope of historical change explained. Second, he allows for an ideological belt 
around economic rationality which is not reducible to the latter. Ultimately, North (1994) 
inappropriately sees neoclassical economics as neglecting institutions and being unable to address time, 
uneven development, path dependence and learning. As a result, he emphasises the need to integrate 
institutional and cognitive analysis across technology, demography and institutions. 
10 See Fine (1997, 1998b, and 1999a and c). For a more popular and an alternative academic account, 
respectively, see Economist (1998) and Lazear (1999). 
11 The term has been used by Stiglitz, one of the leading proponents. Significantly, he has now become 
Head of Research and Chief Economist at the World Bank. 
12 For the new economics applied to labour markets, critical assessment, and an alternative, see Fine 
(1998a). 
13 Note the previously observed role being assigned to historians as providers of raw materials to 
economists to allow model selection and specification of initial conditions. 
14 In contrast, North (1981, p. 50/1) deploys (a naïve notion of) ideology in response to imperfect 
information. It is seen as (unconsciously) theory-driven, simplifies decision-making, is "inextricably 
interwoven with moral and ethical judgements", and is altered when inconsistent with experience. 
15 See also Lamoreaux et al (1997, p. 62) for the presumed affinities between culture and information 
as understood by the new approach: 
 
The question at the heart of this new work - how do economic actors know what (they think) 
they know about their world, and how does what (they think) they know affect their behavior - 
are remarkably similar to those that inform the work of business historians interested in 
adding a cultural dimension to their work. 
16 Elsewhere, Fine (1999e), in the context of consumption, I have discussed how culture and economics 
can be satisfactorily combined in historical studies. 
17 Note Hobsbawm (1997, p. 96) refers to cliometrics as "retrospective econometrics", "because of its 
a-historicity and the highly restrictive nature of its models". See also p. 112. 
 
 
18 Whilst welcoming cliometrics for clarifying hypotheses and arguments and for using counterfactuals 
as a "nonsense detector", Hobsbawm (1997) suggests that its circularity (given rather than explained 
constraints) is one of its four weaknesses, the others being ahistorical theory, exclusive preoccupation 
with rational choice, and undue dependence on unreliable and invented data. 
19 See Vandenberg (1999). 
20 For details of what follows, see Fine et al (1998). 
21 As a typical example, witness the suggestion of Crafts (1999) for whom: 
 
Gerschenkron on development from conditions of economic backwardness still deserves to be 
read and might usefully be revisited from the perspective of modern microeconomics.  
22 Here, though, she is in agreement with Hobsbawm (1997, p. 58): 
 
I have … had close contact with a discipline which does call for considerable brain-power, or 
at least nimbleness, namely economics at Cambridge, UK and USA, and I have never 
forgotten this salutary but depressing experience of trying to keep up with a much cleverer 
body of people", p. 58. Sees trend towards rapprochement between history and social sciences 
which would have been rejected by orthodox historians of the 1890s, with increasing 
economic and social developments, p. 63. 
 
However, he continues from his Marshall Lectures of 1980, p. 95: 
 
For economics, or rather that part of it which from time to tome claims a monopoly of 
defining the subject, has always been a victim of history. For lengthy periods, when the world 
economy appears to be rolling on quite happily with or without advice … proper economics 
has the floor, improper is tacitly excluded, or consigned to the twilight of past and present 
heterodoxy, the equivalent of faith-healing or acupuncture in medicine … However, from time 
to time history catches economists at their brilliant gymnastics and walks off with their 
overcoats. 
23 Even by the standards of the current author who is economist rather than historian by training! But 
see Misa (1999, p. 251): 
 
Given the present diversity of approaches in business and economic history (a short list must 
include Chandlerian, institutional, evolutionary, and cultural approaches) … [the approach] 
needs more explicitly to justify its approach and to relate its approach to these others. 
24 It is ironic, for example, that Lamoreaux's (1998) contribution should lie cheek-by-jowl with Ross' 
(1998) study of social history which covers, for example, the influence of the Annales School which, 
presumably, must be judged by its omission to be unconcerned with economic issues.  
25 See Coats (ed) (1996). Particularly disturbing is the declining number of US students taking PhDs in 
economics whilst those studying there from abroad continue to increase, Coats (1996). See also 
Hodgson and Rothman (1999, p. F165) who report that over 70% of the editors of the "top" thirty 
economic journals are located in the United States, almost 40% in twelve institutions alone. Two-thirds 
of articles are of US authorship, the top twelve institutions accounting for over 20%. As they conclude, 
"the degree of institutional and geographical concentration of editors and authors may be unhealthy for 
innovative research". For the UK, in the light of study of the impact of the Research Assessment 
Exercise on the discipline of economics, see Lee and Harley (1998) who suggest that non-mainstream 
economics could be eliminated from British economics departments within ten years! 
26 See contributions, for example, to American Economic Review, vol LV, no 2, Papers and 
Proceedings, 1965. 
27 A striking illustration of the problematic understanding of information as constituting knowledge is 
provided by the World Bank's 1998 World Development Report, Knowledge for Development, which 
seeks to establish the World Bank as a "knowledge bank". For a critique, see Mehta (1999). 
28 For critical assessments of the post-Washington consensus across a range of analytical and policy 
issues, see papers from the SOAS seminar series, available from jb26@soas.ac.uk. 
29 Crafts is a leading representative, and hence conduit, in straddling economics, economic history and 
development economics. See Crafts (1999) for example. See also his discussion of the relevance of 
endogenous growth theory for economic history, Crafts (1995). See Fine (1999b) for a critical survey 
of the new growth theory in the context of the colonisation of other social sciences by economics. 
 
 
30 Irrespective of the validity of its judgements in practice as opposed to principle, the imperative 
implied by Douglas and Isherwood (1996, p. xxvi) in the new introduction to the World of Goods, can 
only be applauded: 
 
Methodological individualism is now so much under attack that the only thing wanting for its 
defeat is a range of alternative assumptions to take its place, and several are in the air. 
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